Fixing the FBI?

First, be clear on what's wrong...

As I explain to neighbors and friends who ask me what’s going on with the FBI, one must understand that there are two FBI’s. There is Headquarters, where many of the people carrying badges resemble FBI Agents. And there is the Field, where the people carrying badges really are FBI Agents and work hard and diligently to meet the demands of their oath (and by “oath", I use the word as a shorthand for not only the terms of the oath itself, but also the ingrained historical reputation of the Bureau for integrity, honesty and allegiance to the truth regardless of where it leads). True, there are some of them in HQ - good ones we have all known, but in my experience they have a tough time because so many others in HQ have personal and bureaucratic priorities independent of the oath. I have seen too many of the few good ones killed off, bureaucratically speaking, because they would not submit to the demands for fealty over duty. Thus the Field best operates despite HQ - perhaps that has changed since my retirement many years ago, but I doubt it. And when one sees an investigation run out of HQ, by HQ, with leads covered by HQ managers, one can be reasonably well assured of two things: that the investigation will not be run by the book (that “oath” concept again), and that the underlying impetus of the investigation will be to certify pre-determined results that have more to do with political agendas than objective determination of facts.

This problem has been exacerbated by the FBI’s traditional advancement practices – simply put, advancement in the FBI is voluntary. To seek promotion to senior positions, one must first volunteer for it. There are selection policies, but the pool from which supervisory positions, and ultimately higher level positions, are filled is created by those asking to do so. Generally, the best and brightest investigators do not seek advancement – the less accomplished, those uncomfortable with investigating, even some who are afraid of it (and they do exist) see advancement as a desirable alternative, an escape, in a sense. Ability as an investigator is not a selection criteria. Experience as an investigator is not a selection criteria. Willingness and desire to advance is. Thus unless the advancement system is changed to identify and promote merit and demonstrated ability rather than solicit and promote volunteers, I doubt that any reforms can be lasting.

Once in the system, they compete, they are assessed and promoted by those above them... and those above them are unavoidably of the same lineage, so advancement of people smarter or more capable than they is rare. It is a self-serving, self-defeating cycle. My prior experience was in the military where, if you were good, you were dragged up – kicking and screaming if necessary, but you were not allowed to settle in to your comfort zone and be left alone. The best and brightest were obligated to advance and thereby improve and sustain the quality of the organization as well as positively affect others in greater numbers... to the greater benefit of the organization and its mission. It is not a fool-proof system, to be sure, but it does work. Also, to be advanced you are expected to spend time learning your profession – time developing and maturing. Bluntly, there are managers in the FBI with a year or less in the field actually working as an investigator.

There is a second factor that has come into play relatively recently, beginning with the Freeh reign. Historically, all senior positions in the FBI were filled by FBI Special Agents. Now, that did not mean that the best and the brightest agents were identified and advanced (as explained above) but it did mean that everybody who did advance had been trained as an Agent, inculcated with the essential historical culture of the FBI, allegiance to legal principles, an ethos of honor and historical record of impartiality of function. That is no small thing. Freeh began the process of diluting this dynamic to appease Congress who was upset at the large number of agents assigned to HQ during a time of rising crime. Freeh offered to reduce that number – and did. What he didn’t do (but it was implied to satisfy Congress) was eliminate the positions vacated. Instead, he backfilled them with non-Agent personnel from outside the FBI. Mueller accelerated this trend significantly, also expanding the FBI’s core mission from criminal and foreign counter-intelligence investigations to include more generalized intelligence gathering and analysis, essentially creating a domestic version of the CIA (CIA by law restricted to acting outside the US). Thus you have a wider, more ambiguous mission and an organization staffed at senior levels by a large number of personnel who are not inculcated in the FBI’s historic culture of professionalism, integrity, honesty and objectivity. They are political functionaries and job holders who owe more allegiance to those who hired them than to the traditions and underlying principles of the organization.

One other trend also bears mentioning. I think it dates back to the ABSCAM scandals on Capitol Hill. The FBI had always been a fiercely independent determiner of facts. For example, during my first office tour in 1973-74, if an Assistant US Attorney tried to direct or influence an investigation, I would tell my supervisor, who would raise it with the SAC, who would call HQ in Washington, who would then raise hell with DOJ, who would reach out to the AUSA and tell him to back off. When I went back to the field in 1995, that was no longer true. US Attorneys were running cases in the field.

There has been a determined effort to bring the FBI to heel ever since ABSCAM in 1980, to tether it to the political interests of Congress and the DOJ, and this effort has transcended administrations and political ideologies. An independent FBI was too dangerous, too likely to embarrass vested political interests. As an example, Washington Field Office agents working foreign counter-intelligence could not follow Soviet personnel onto Capitol Hill without getting prior approval from HQ... not even known KGB and GRU agents. Capitol Hill was a Soviet agent sanctuary.

And remember the essence of the FBI - is the character and integrity of the field. That is where the professional, experienced investigators are, imbued with the historical culture of honest, objective, independent determination of facts. So you cannot allow the Field to run a case with “political consequences” in the balance. This effort has largely succeeded, coupled with the other factors mentioned above, and the FBI is now a wholly subservient subordinate agency of the DOJ, and specifically of politically appointed and beholden DOJ officials. Hence my comment above about cases run by and from HQ.

Colleen Rowley (see below) illustrates the problem - she seems proud of the fact that so many good, competent agents refuse to serve at HQ. Hello??? In the words of the immortal Pogo, “We have found the problem, and the problem is us.”

Three Steps to Fixing the FBI: Interview with Whistleblower Coleen Rowley